Considering changes, especially in recent months in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the IR's relations with them and the United States and Israel, the Political-Executive Board of the Left Party of Iran (People's Fadaian) happened to have a series of talks to discuss the political situation in the region, and the following summary is the outcome of those talks.
A Look at the Political Developments in the Region and the Obstacles to the Regional Policies of the Islamic Republic!
Developments that have taken place in the region in recent months have changed the situation to the detriment of the policies of the Islamic Republic (IR) in some countries and have weakened its position in the region. Several factors play role in this process, the most important of which are: recent developments in Iraq after the formation of the new government, formation of the balance of fragile forces in Syria and political, social and economic developments in Lebanon. These factors, along with the economic and political pressures of the United States government, as well as various Israeli offensive operations, have posed many problems for the regional policy of the IR. On the other hand, due to the destructive performance and policies of the IR and the bottlenecks resulting from the intensification of United States government sanctions, the situation in the country has become more unstable and the government's ability to continue its costly policies in the region has dimished.
1. Developments in Iraq:
The formation of Mustafa al-Kazemi's government in Iraq after months of trying to get out of the political crisis in this country, following a year of popular protests against the inefficient ruling political system and the intervention of other governments and most of all the IR's influence in this country has largely changed the page to its detriment. Although a significant number of Iraqi parliamentarians and influential members of the government still have close ties to the IR, the formation of the Kazemi government was in fact the result of a balance of power, which is largely influenced by the popular movement in Iraq.
After a period of uncertainty and under the pressure of the Corona crisis, the new Iraqi government was formed to end the unrest in the country and enjoys support of most of the country's political forces, including Sunni and Kurdish politicians. The government's actions were in response to the demands of the protesting people to limit foreign interference in Iraq's internal affairs and to curb militant forces. The attempt to take control of the militant forces formed in the Hasd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces – PMF) and the return of General Abdul Wahab al-Saadi to command the Iraqi counterterrorism force, were clear signs of prioritizing this approach. Al-Saadi was ousted by the previous government and had many supporters among the popular protest movement.
The return of General Abdul Wahab al-Saadi became significant when, on June 26, 2020, the Iraqi army issued a statement arresting 14 individuals who had previously "fired rockets" at government targets and the United States diplomatic facilities. Although the statement did not mention the organizational affiliation of individuals, various sources said that the detainees were senior members of the Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the battalions that make up Hasd al-Shaabi.
But the assassination of well-known security expert Hisham Hashemi showed that the internal situation in Iraq is still far from returning to the necessary political stability. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, some media outlets have blamed pro IR militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, for the killings. Others, however, blame the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) for the assassination.
The Iraqi government's move to gain more control over the militant forces, which are mainly backed by the Quds Force, is a development that undermines the IR's position in Iraq and is at the same time an attempt to end the country's transformation into a rivalry war zone between the IR and the United States.
Al-Kazemi's visit to Iran and his meeting with the Supreme Leader of the IR should be explained as the declaration of a new will in the political structure of Iraq to the IR.
2. Developments in Syria:
The IR entered the civil war in Syria when the regime of Bashar al-Assad was severely weakened. The purpose of intervening in Syria was to preserve the regime and strengthen the "Resistance Front" against Israel. From the outset, relations with the Assad regime were important as they provided the IR with direct contact with Lebanon and support for Hezbollah. Although the military presence in Syria was justified by the rise of ISIS as a precautionary measure against that force outside its borders, it was first and foremost to maintain the Assad regime in Syria as the sole Arab ally and channel of communication with its armed allies in Lebanon.
Although the presence of the IR in Syria was in cooperation with Russia and in coordination with it in defense of the Assad regime, but the continuation of this presence is not necessarily in line with Russia's plans for the future of Syria. Thus, despite their close cooperation in defending the Assad regime, Russia has so far not reacted to prevent Israeli attacks on the positions of the IR. On the contrary, it has developed a very close relationship with Israel's right-wing government over the years and has implicitly shared its "concerns." In addition, in the recent conflict over Idlib (Aleppo) between Turkey and the Assad government, which sought to liberate the city from the opposition and forces close to Turkey with the help of forces affiliated with the IR, by accepting a ceasefire proposed by Turkey, Russia has shown in practice that it pursues goals beyond just maintaining the Assad regime. First and foremost, Russia is trying to maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean. Hence, it seeks to strike a balance between the two sides involved in Syria. The agreement between Russia and Turkey on a ceasefire in Idlib, in addition to the Assad regime itself, was in fact by-passing of the IR as one of the parties to the negotiations between the three governments in recent years.
The agreement between Turkey and the United States in Syria and the unannounced coordination of the two with Israel is another factor in the challenge with the IR in this country. In addition to Turkey's efforts to occupy a significant portion of the northern Syria, the implementation of the so-called "Caesar Law" imposes new restrictions on governments involved in Syria, which, given the size of current United States sanctions against the IR, may not seem significant at first glance, but it will definitely intensify them further. The purpose of this law is to force the government of Bashar al-Assad through diplomatic means and economic pressures to transfer power to a new government that is committed to human rights and the rule of law. Under this law, governments, groups, companies, and individuals who directly or indirectly provide financial or military assistance to the Syrian government are subject to the United States sanctions, including the IR and its allied militias, including Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Fatemiyoun Brigade.
In addition, given the current poor economic situation in the country, another problem for the IR is to provide financial resources to continue its presence in Syria. The cost of being in Syria is now being questioned within the regime itself. Falahatpisheh's (a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the parliament) talk about paying about $20 to $30 billion to the Syrian government is an example. But the cost of being in Syria, in addition to cash or credit aid to the Syrian government, is certainly much higher than these figures. Given the organization of paramilitary forces such as the Fatemiyoun or Zeynabiyoun Brigades and their costs, it will be very difficult to secure their presence. Despite the current situation where the government treasury is emptier than ever and the IR is insisting on continuing this presence, it has to limit it.
3- Demonstrations against Hezbollah in Lebanon:
On Sunday, June 7, after the restrictions on the Corona epidemic were reduced, the Lebanese people took to the streets again and staged a large demonstration with the slogan of disarming Hezbollah, during which people wearing Lebanese flag masks called for disarming of Hezbollah. The demonstrations led to clashes between protesters and Hezbollah supporters and police intervention.
Lebanon's Hezbollah is backed by the IR and its main ally in the region. For this reason, in the first reaction, the media of the IR declared the Beirut demonstrations as a "sedition" against Hezbollah.
Anti-government protests in Lebanon began in October last year, and the main slogan of these protests is the removal of corrupt politicians and the implementation of reforms in the political and economic structure of the country. Now, after the Corona epidemic, the escalation of the economic crisis, the 50% fall of the Lebanese currency, and the spread of poverty and living below 45% of the population below the poverty line and unemployment of about 35%, public anger against the ruling political system and political and military groups including Hezbollah is aroused.
There are many who attribute part of Lebanon's economic problems to the cessation of investment in Lebanon and the decline of Arab aid to the country, given the growing influence of Hezbollah in the Lebanese government. On the other hand, the Lebanese government's efforts to apply for a multibillion-dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund also face obstacles. The International Monetary Fund, while agreeing to the loan requested by the Lebanese government, is calling for some reforms in the country, including the liberalization of the Lebanese national currency against foreign currencies, reform of appointments based on merit, transparency of contracts, budget reform, tax increases, abolition of subsidies and reforming the structure of the banking system.
Although Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab has called for "national unity", protests in recent weeks have shown that in addition to economic problems, a political structure based on ethnic and religious divisions, Hezbollah's presence as a "shadow government" with an army parallel to the Lebanese army and obedient to a foreign government has provoked a sharp reaction from the people against this force, and the continuation of the current influence of the IR in Lebanon is facing new problems.
4. Missiles of Iranian Origin and Arms Embargo:
Last year, after the Saudi oil facility was hit by a missile, although the Houthi insurgents claimed responsibility for the attack, the United States government blamed the IR. Most recently, however, the UN Secretary-General's June 12 report by confirming the "Iranian origin" of the missiles used in the attack on Saudi Arabia effectively dropped the ball on the IR court. The United Nations has previously stated that it would not be able to independently confirm the Iranian origin of the equipment used in the attack on the Aramco facility.
At the same time, the UN Secretary-General announced that the shipments that the United States seized in November 2019 and February 2020 in the waters near Yemen were carrying weapons of "Iranian origin".
The UN Secretary-General's report has entered the debate on ending the IR's arms embargo, which is part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and which was to be lifted five years after it was signed in a new phase. Concerning the IR's regional policies and the continuation of its missile program, the United States government has called for an extension of the arms embargo. According to the United States government, the IR's missile program is contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This program is criticized by the European governments as well.
The extension of the IR's arms embargo was the main topic of discussion at a virtual meeting of the UN Security Council on June 30, which the United States government called for the extension of the sanctions. Russia and China opposed it and Europe, while advising to maintain JCPOA, is considering drafting a resolution to temporarily extend arms embargoes. But it is unclear whether such a resolution will be agreed upon by the United States or Russia and China.
5 - Relations with the United States and its Impact:
The United States government is pleased to see the expansion of the IR’s influence in Iraq shrinking after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and the establishment of a new government in that country. The arrest of members of Kata’ib Hezbollah is as much criticized by the IR as it is welcomed by the United States government.
The exchange of prisoners through intermediaries, although indicating the existence of informal channels between the two governments and their activism, the passage of a resolution against the IR in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, despite other Security Council members' insistence on maintaining JCPOA, means that the return of the IR's nuclear file to the UN Security Council is not completely ruled out.
Changes in the IR's relations with the United States government are unlikely before the United States presidential election. And after the election, even if Trump loses and Joe Biden wins and a democratic government takes office in the United States, everything will not return to where they were after the JCPOA agreement. At the time of the agreement, JCPOA was also the first step for the United States and other governments, which had to be completed with subsequent agreements, including in other areas, and gradually normalize relations with the IR. This process was first and foremost obstructed in the IR itself by Khamenei himself and those close to him.
If Biden wins, the Democrats may make return to the JCPOA conditional on renegotiating it and other issues, and will likely try to reach an agreement with the European Union and even China and Russia. Even if the IR intends to get rid of the current situation after the United States elections, it will have to take serious steps to change its policies in all areas, including regional politics and relations with neighboring countries.
In addition, the need to change regional policy requires a different view of the arrayal of various forces in the region. In this area, it is not possible to reach an agreement with the United States again by continuing to say “death to Israel”. It should be noted that the influence of the right-wing government of Israel and its supporters in the United States Middle East policy, along with the insistence of rivals such as Saudi Arabia on continuing hostile policies with the IR, play a significant role in continuation of the current situation. It does not matter which party is in power in the US, even if the IR limit its adventurous interventions in the region it will not be able to have a normal relations not only with the US, but also with European countries without changing its policy towards the Israeli government.
6. Hostility towards Israel:
The IR has not only refused to recognize the existence of Israel since it came to power, but has also ideologized the differences between Israel and Palestine and made it one of the foundations of its policy in the region and the world. Hostility to Israel has been a major aspect of the IR's tense foreign policy since its inception. This aspect of the IR's foreign policy was not adjusted even during the nuclear negotiations that led to the JCPOA agreement. After JCPOA, the Revolutionary Guards fired rockets with the Hebrew slogan of destroying Israel.
In Israel, too, the conflict with the IR has effectively overshadowed the issue of the occupation of Palestinian territories and peace talks. The IR's support for Hamas and other radical religious forces has been used as an excuse by the opposition to peace with the Palestinians to continue occupying and annexing Palestinian territories to Israel, and has led to the continuation of the rule of the most right-wing parties in Israeli politics.
Hostility to Israel has also fueled reciprocal hostility. In recent years, the Israeli government has been one of the strongest opponents of negotiations with the IR and the “JCPOA” agreement, and has not refrained from taking any action against the IR's nuclear program. In cyber sabotage, the assassination of nuclear scientists and the bombing of protected and security facilities are first and foremost blamed on Israel. The Israeli government has acknowledged fewer acts of sabotage, but the announcement of the transfer of a large portion of the nuclear project documents to Israel and their display indicates the Israeli government's extensive plans in this area.
Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria and the presence of the forces of the IR in this country, Israel has carried out several air operations in Syria. These bombings, which have recently increased in number, have mainly targeted forces affiliated with the IR and its allies, with the intention of weakening them. The Israeli government has not yet officially claimed responsibility for the attacks, but has always expressed dissatisfaction with the military presence of the IR and its allied forces, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, in Syria, calling it a threat to its security.
The explosion in Natanz in recent days showed that the front that the IR has opened outside Iran under the name of “strategic depth” has practically been transferred to inside of Iran with these explosions. The situation is such that Israel is carrying out destructive actions not only in Syria but also inside the country and in sensitive centers of the nuclear project. Explosions in such centers can cause catastrophic and irreparable human and environmental damage. Those who planted bombs in the two super-security centers of the IR could have other plans for such devastating explosions. These explosions are a sign of a hidden war that at any time, could lead to a catastrophe if it continues.
7- Internal Opposition:
The policies of the IR in the region have been challenged inside the country more than before. The people in the important protests of recent years, both in December 2017 and October 2019, including the recent demonstrations in Behbahan, have explicitly condemned these policies and called for an end to the imposition of costs of the IR's military presence in Syria, Iraq and other critical areas on themselves.
8. Other Obstacles:
To maintain its influence in the region, the IR is facing the hostility of Israel, Saudi Arabia and its allied Arab states, as well as competition with Turkey. At the international level, in addition to the United States, it is also struggling with important international actors, including Europe, Russia and China, over its military presence in the Arab world.
Except on the withdrawal from the JCPOA, the European Union (EU) has a more or less common position with the United States, including in connection with the missile program and policies of the IR in the region, especially the arming of its affiliated militias in other countries. For example, one of the EU's conditions for helping the Lebanese government, like the United States, is the disarmament of the IR's most important armed ally, Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The Russian government has not publicly opposed the IR's regional policy, although military cooperation with the IR in Syria has shown that it is willing to share action with the IR if necessary. But at the same time, it has very close relations with the IR's main rivals in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel. In the UN Security Council, considering its own interests, it has always cooperated with the United States and Europe in some cases and has not used its veto power in favor of the IR.
The Chinese government is not showing interest in getting involved in the regional crises and in the case of Syria, all it has done is being supportive of Russia. But it is always seeking to secure its economic interests in the region. China's good relations with all major governments in the region testify to this claim. Today, China is becoming an economic partner of important regional governments, including Iran. The issue of concluding a 25-year cooperation agreement with the IR has become an important issue of the day, and if it is signed, it can bring great economic benefits to a foreign government in Iran. But there is doubt that such agreements could lead to a significant change in China's regional policy.
9. Finally:
The regional policy of the IR, which is mostly based on ideological-military influence and the organization of armed units in critical areas of the region, faces several obstacles. For instance, the current influence of the IR in the region, which has an interventionist and aggressive aspect, is not commensurate with its presence in other areas, such as economic and cultural areas. Also, today, the financial and human resources of the IR are not sufficient to continue its policy in its former dimensions. It is already facing problems due to the economic situation of the country. At the same time, given the severity of the IR's differences with the United States and its allies in the region, the conflict in this area will become more costly over time, and the line-up against the IR will become wider.
While condemning the terrorist and subversive acts of the right-wing Israeli government in Iran, we believe that questioning the existence of Israel in justifying the government's adventurous policies in the region is a good platform for escalating tensions. People are the ones who pay the price for such ideological policy. By continuing this policy, the IR, has sacrificed the national interests of the country and the interests of the Palestinian people as well for its beliefs. Blind enmity with Israel has nothing to do with the interests of the country and the people of Iran. The recent explosions at the IR's nuclear and missile facilities are a warning that the continuation of the status quo is dangerous.
The regional policy of the IR, by involving our country in critical areas, has intensified tensions and caused harmful damage to our country in every way. Defending the Assad regime and organizing militant movements has led to the notoriety of our country and the spread of hatred of Iran and Iranians in some Arab countries. The strategic depth policy of the IR has become a dark spot for our country's relations with its neighbors and friends in the region. Our country needs to establish friendly relations with all governments in the region. The leaders of the IR claim that by advancing the policy of strategic depth, they have been able to take the war in the streets of Tehran to the battlefields of other countries and provide security within the borders of the country. But the recent explosions, especially the one in Natanz, proved once again how the expressions of concern and warnings, including by our party, that strategic depth policy has actually made the country more insecure were real and appropriate.
Now, in the run-up to the United States presidential election, it is not unlikely that Trump and his regional partners will stir up the atmosphere with adventurous actions. By magnifying and pretending the threat of the IR to the region and the world, especially the United States and Israel, and creating a foreign crisis, they could incite domestic nationalist sentiments and influence American voters to make up for his lagging behind from his rival Joe Biden. In these critical circumstances, the presence of Mahan planes in the skies of Syria and Lebanon, whose flights have been banned by the United States and countries such as Germany, France and Italy due to the history of carrying military weapons to these areas, is dangerous and highly provocative. There is no doubt that the policies of the United States government and its allies have stirred up the Middle East, turning the region into a hotbed of constant hostilities and proxy wars, and providing a breeding ground for extremist forces. United States imperialist and hegemonic policies endanger the establishment of peace and stability in the region, serve the interests of the reactionary governments of the region. These policies are supported and strengthened by those reactionary governments. Our party has repeatedly condemned this coercive and intrusive policy of the United States.
The policy of the Left Party of Iran (People’s Fadaian) has always been to emphasize the end of the ideological, tense and adventurous foreign policy of the IR, withdrawal from critical areas and renunciation of organizing militant forces. Today, we still believe that withdrawal from critical areas and changing the country's policy towards peace and security in the region is the only way to secure the interests of the country and the Iranian people.
Today more than ever, it is imperative to declare readiness for dialogue, friendship with all nations on the basis of mutual interests, peacekeeping, security in the region and the world, and orientation towards economic, political and cultural cooperation.
Political-Executive Board of the Left Party of Iran (People’s Fadaian)
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