July 11, 2026
The war that took place in two stages of 12 and 39 days with the aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran was one of the most important political and military developments in the region in recent decades. In addition to extensive human, economic and infrastructural losses, this war also changed the political balance in Iran, the region and even at the international level. The MOU that was reached after this war was not the result of a change in the nature of the conflicting parties or mutual trust, but rather the product of the conditions that the war imposed on all actors.
In the current situation, the ceasefire cannot be considered the end of the war, but rather a new stage of competition and redefining the balance of power between the conflicting parties. The recent clashes after the ceasefire, rather than being a sign of the beginning of a new war, are reflection of each side's efforts to consolidate its understanding of the results of the war and increase its bargaining power in negotiations. Therefore, the future of developments depends on the continuation of negotiations and how the fundamental differences between the main regional and global players are resolved or persisted.
1- Achievements of the MOU for the Islamic Republic
The talks have so far been on the path of stabilization and progress, with ups and downs, rather than moving towards failure. Although it is not yet possible to speak with certainty about its final fate, the possibility of reaching some kind of agreement in the medium term is greater than a return to war.
In the Geneva talks, the United States agreed to some of the Islamic Republic's demands, including lifting the naval blockade, suspending some sanctions, continuing low-concentration enrichment under the supervision of the IAEA, establishing a $300 billion fund for the reconstruction of affected areas, and a ceasefire in Lebanon, and suspended the oil and petrochemical embargo for 60 days. Although this MOU is temporary and its full implementation is accompanied by ambiguities, and parts of it have also been suspended in the recent conflict, it has not yet been abandoned.
The relative change in the positions of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which were affected by the spread of the war and the insecurity of the region, helped strengthen diplomacy. These countries strengthened the path of diplomacy by exerting political pressure on the United States and playing a role in reconstruction.
2- Why Was This Memorandum Formed?
The MOU was more a result of the stalemate that the continuation of the war had created for all parties than a product of mutual trust.
The initial plan of the United States and Israel was to force the Islamic Republic to accept their terms in a short period of time by delivering quick and heavy blows. Extensive attacks were carried out on military centers, infrastructure, and senior commanders with the aim of paralyzing or collapsing the decision-making structure of the Islamic Republic.
These attacks caused heavy damage to Iran and the Islamic Republic, but contrary to initial expectations, the regime did not collapse and the political and military structure continued to administer affairs, albeit with difficulty.
In contrast, the Islamic Republic tried to expand the scope of the war beyond its borders. The threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz, attacking US bases and disrupting energy exports put significant pressure on the global economy and led China, Europe and Arab countries to support a reduction in tensions and a return to negotiations.
The continuation of the war also faced the United States with increasing financial and political costs and an uncertain prospect of victory. As a result, neither the Islamic Republic was able to continue a war of attrition without heavy costs, nor did the United States and Israel achieve their initial goals. This situation paved the way for the acceptance of negotiations and reaching a temporary MOU.
The MOU is more than anything the product of a change in the balance of power, the increase in the costs of war for all parties and their inability to impose their will through military means, rather than a sign of the resolution of the fundamental contradictions between them. Therefore, achieving a lasting peace remains fraught with serious uncertainties.
3- What Consequences did the War Leave at the Regional and International Levels?
The recent war also changed the political balances of the region and the world to some extent. The first result was that the military solution to the differences between Iran, the United States and Israel, contrary to the expectations of the war-seeking forces, did not come to fruition. Despite heavy blows, the Islamic Republic did not collapse, and the United States and Israel did not achieve their stated goals. The illusion of some of the domestic war-seeking forces who saw war as a way to overthrow the regime also collapsed, and at the same time, domestic repression intensified.
For the Islamic Republic, the survival of the power structure after such a war will be advertised as a political success, and the regime will try to use it to rebuild its domestic and regional position, although this does not mean gaining social legitimacy.
In contrast, the United States and especially Israel faced a situation that was far from their initial goals. The continuation of the Lebanon war, increasing political pressures, disagreements with some of its Western allies, and deepening internal divisions have further complicated Israel's position.
Europe has also come to realize more than ever the need to contain the crisis through diplomacy. At the global level, Russia and especially China have benefited to some extent from the change in circumstances, although their relations with Iran will continue to be subject to their national interests.
The Arab countries of the region have also become more inclined than before to play the role of mediator and maintainer of stability. However, these developments do not mean the end of geopolitical competition, and as long as the fundamental differences between the Islamic Republic, the United States and Israel are not resolved, the possibility of a return to war will still exist.
4- The Situation of the Iranian Regime and People After the War?
The war also changed the power structure in Iran. Some of these changes have become apparent and others will probably manifest themselves in the future.
One of the most important consequences of the war is the change at the top of the power pyramid of the Islamic Republic. Although the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei took place in extraordinary wartime conditions without overt tension, he has not yet been able to regain the position that his father had created in the structure of the Islamic Republic over several decades. The wartime conditions caused opposition and doubts about this transfer of power to be temporarily marginalized, but as the atmosphere of war subsides, latent questions and disagreements about the leadership structure and the way the country is run may resurface.
For this reason, it cannot be expected that the issue of succession will have been removed from the agenda of internal conflicts within the regime. On the contrary, as the security environment decreases, it is likely that this issue will become one of the important centers of competition within the power structure.
So far, what has been announced in the name of Mojtaba Khamenei’s positions is a repetition of the positions of his father, Ali Khamenei. It neither creates an obstacle to negotiations nor accepts responsibility for them. He issues both an agreement and an order to negotiate for today and an opposition without an executive aspect for tomorrow. owever, he currently does not have much real position and influence as a leader.
An important and noteworthy point is that Mojtaba Khamenei has so far failed to fulfill his role as the Supreme Leader, and the Islamic Republic has effectively become without a Supreme Leader. The parliament is currently closed and no protest has been raised by the Supreme Leader. The Vice President questions the position and power of the Supreme Leader and says that the Supreme Leader’s words are not irrevocable, and again we are not witnessing an appropriate response. On the most important issue of Iranian society today, namely negotiation or war, the factions have clashed, and both sides have taken the written message of Mojtaba Khamenei as irrevocable, yet the Supreme Leader is absent and the conflict continues. All of this reinforces the assumption that as if the Islamic Republic has entered an era without a Supreme Leader.
Another important issue is the strengthening of the position of the military and security forces as a result of the war. In wartime, major decision-making was left to military institutions, but if negotiations continue and the risk of war decreases, the role of the government and bureaucracy will gradually increase. This issue itself has become one of the axes of disagreement within the regime. Some of the military forces that gained more influence during the war are reluctant to lose their position, and in return, the government and the administrative apparatus will try to regain their authority. Therefore, one of the main conflicts after the war will be between these two forces.
At the same time, the traditional alignments of the Islamic Republic are also changing. The past divisions between fundamentalists and reformists, or the right and left of the regime, are no longer able to explain the new arrangement of forces on their own. Maintaining the power structure, managing the consequences of the war, advancing negotiations, and the contribution of each part of the regime in the new structure will pave the way for new coalitions and divisions.
But even if the regime can overcome these crises, society will remain restless. The majority of Iranians were already facing deep economic crises, inflation, unemployment, declining purchasing power, structural corruption, and political constraints before the war. The widespread killings of people, especially on January 8 and 9, left a deep sense of anger and hatred for the regime. The war and confrontation with the United States and Israel, although temporarily overshadowed this dissatisfaction, did not eliminate it.
As the atmosphere of war subsides, livelihoods will once again become the most important concern of the people. Even the release of some financial resources or the suspension of some sanctions, given the regime’s priorities, will probably not make a noticeable difference in people’s lives, because the bulk of these resources will be spent on rebuilding military power, compensating for war damage, strengthening security and ideological institutions, and structural corruption will also swallow up some of it.
The humanitarian consequences of the war will also gradually become more apparent. The families of the dead, injured and traumatized will pursue their demands, and at the same time, security clashes, executions, arrests of civil activists, legal cases and anger resulting from the killing of protesters in January, which were not allowed to be expressed in the atmosphere of war, will once again become one of the main axes of public dissatisfaction.
5- Outlook for Developments
The developments after the war show that although the possibility of the continuation of the negotiation process has increased compared to the war period, it cannot yet be considered the beginning of a lasting peace. As long as the hostility against Israel is not ended, the risk of a return to the crisis remains. Even if the negotiations between Iran and the United States reach further results, this will not in itself mean the end of all areas of conflict. The region continues to face a series of accumulated crises and any major incident could rekindle the flames of confrontation.
The heavy costs of war, the need for economic stability, pressure on the energy market, concerns about regional instability, the need for the United States to focus on global competition with China, and the Islamic Republic’s need to rebuild its military and economic power are among the factors that could push the parties toward limited agreements and managing tensions to prevent a widespread conflict. On the other hand, fundamental differences over Iran’s regional status, the Islamic Republic’s stance toward Israel, the nuclear issue and missile deterrence program, the role of proxy forces, deep distrust between the parties, and major powers competition are factors that work in the opposite direction.
Opponents of the negotiation process, both inside and outside the Islamic Republic, have different motives for thwarting this process. Some extremist factions in the regime continue to pursue a strategy of permanent confrontation and consider any agreement to be a retreat. There are also forces outside the regime that see the continuation of the crisis as more suitable for their political goals. Therefore, the possibility of sabotage, provocation, and the creation of new crises should not be underestimated.
By moving away from the atmosphere of war, Iran’s internal issues will once again become the main axis of developments. The experience of the past years has shown that whenever the external threat has decreased, the accumulated economic, social, and political demands of society have manifested themselves with greater intensity.
Today, the most important axis of people’s dissatisfaction is, above all, livelihoods and quality of life. Chronic inflation, reduced purchasing power, widespread poverty, the housing crisis, the high cost of medicine and medical services, unemployment, and job insecurity continue to put pressure on the lives of millions of people. If current economic policies continue and there is no tangible improvement in the lives of the majority of the people, trade union and livelihood protests will once again spread.
Regime’s policies continue to increase the livelihood pressure on the people. The doubling of the price of bread in the midst of the current negotiations is contrary to the expectations of the majority of the people. Therefore, even if the agreements lead to a relative improvement in economic conditions, regime’s policy is not necessarily aimed at reducing the pressure on the people. The same view that created a price shock under the pretext of preventing famine continues to influence the regime and considers welfare to be an obstacle to growth and development and is influenced by the policies supported by the Chamber of Commerce. Unbridled inflation and soaring prices, including in the field of medicine and medical services, are the consequences of such policies.
The unbearable livelihood pressure, coupled with widespread political dissatisfaction and intensified repression, could ultimately lead to increased confrontation between the people and the regime. If current policies continue, it will lead to the formation of a comprehensive movement with greater weight of economic and social demands. The beginning and expansion of labor protests after the ceasefire announcement is also a sign of the continuation of this trend.
6- Our Policies and Duties
Considering the new conditions, the developments resulting from the war confirm the basic orientations approved by the Congress of our party.
Our party continues to believe that the solution to Iran’s problems lies not in foreign war, intensification of militarism, pressure and sanctions, but in expanding peace, strengthening diplomacy, relying on the will of the Iranian people and creating fundamental changes in the political, economic and social structure of the country and ending the corrupt and authoritarian system of the Islamic Republic.
Therefore, any action that reduces the risk of war and provides the basis for resolving differences through negotiations is, overall, a positive step and benefits democracy. However, one should not be overly optimistic about its results. Lasting peace is only possible when the main factors that created the crisis are eliminated.
In the current situation, our party emphasizes the need to suspend enrichment and continue negotiations to reach a lasting agreement. Continuing the military race and returning to policies based on escalating the crisis will be, above all, to the detriment of the Iranian people and other nations in the region.
In the domestic arena, the most important task of the left and freedom-loving forces is to defend the rights and demands of the Iranian people. The struggle for the release of political and ideological prisoners, opposition to the death penalty, confronting the security environment, defending freedom of association, strikes, protests, the press and parties, and supporting the women's movement, workers, teachers, retirees, students, and other social movements remain at the center of our policies.
We also emphasize the need to confront policies that increase the economic burden on the majority of the people. From increasing the prices of basic goods and eliminating social protections to rent-seeking privatizations, shifting the burden of the economic crisis to wage earners, these are policies that deepen the class divide.
We believe that Iran needs more than ever the formation of a democratic, republican, independent, and people-based alternative. The recent war faced a crisis among some of the opposition forces and changed previous alignments, but the clarification of the destructive consequences of the war can pave the way for the forces to come closer together. The forces defending democracy must strive to create a center for coordination and cooperation in order to end the Islamic Republic.
Political-Executive Board of the Left Party of Iran
July 11, 2026
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