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Regarding the Current Political Situation in Iran

Regarding the Current Political Situation in Iran
Statement of the Central Council of the Left Party of Iran (People’s Fadaian)

Regarding the Current Political Situation in Iran

Statement of the Central Council of the Left Party of Iran (People’s Fadaian)

Addressing the country's political situation requires deliberation and emphasis on the current critical situation.

At the moment, all the pillars of the country are affected by the unprecedented outbreak of the Corona virus and its visible and invisible dimensions and damages. The procrastination of the leaders of the IR in taking immediate and necessary measures to prevent the spread of the Corona virus from the very beginning has put the country in a nightmare. News from all over the country suggests that the relentless efforts in hospitals and medical centers with selfless sacrifices of medical staff, including doctors, nurses and other medical staff to save lives from the contagious disease of COVID-19 is underway. However, the lack of safety equipment for medical staff, disinfectants, diagnostic equipment, medicine and other necessary facilities, especially the lack of the regime’s high level decisions, has made it difficult to deal with this crisis. The incompetent and corrupt system of the IR is unable to organize its affairs in a timely manner and distribute the facilities available in the country. Hospitals and medical staff are forced to pay their immediate needs by paying several times its price from the black market established by the gangs linked to the ruling gangs. On the other hand, due to the comprehensive US sanctions, the import of medicine and medical needs into the country is limited. The scale of the tragedy is still unclear, and the gap between the official news and the actual news of Corona sufferers and victims is much larger than officially announced.

The Corona crisis exacerbated the incompetency of the IR, divulged the regime's lies and corruption and undermined the IR's methods of resorting to superstition, proliferation of shrines and the propaganda of misguided Friday prayer leaders. After Corona, the people in real time witnessed the closure of shrines and saw that the shrines were not able to execute any miracles and were just places to raise money for the regime. Just as the boycott of the 11th parliamentary elections exposed the unprecedented expansion of people's distrust of the regime.

Undoubtedly, Corona will be restrained, but the IR will no longer be what it used to be and the spread of superstitions to deceive the people will not have the effect that the regime has benefited from over the past four decades.

Before the outbreak of the Corona virus, all the country's news was circulating around the 11th parliamentary elections, which was the least prosperous election in the IR's lifetime. The news of the outbreak of the Corona virus in Qom and some other cities was not taken seriously under the pretext of holding the election, but with all this secrecy, the level of public participation was very low. The election results showed that the social base of the regime was weaker, the dimensions of opposition to it were wider and it was more isolated than ever. In this election, Ali Khamenei and the institutions under his command tried to completely wipe out the reformists, abandon even a part of the fundamentalists and hand over the parliament to their obedient forces and, above all, to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the security forces.

This fact has completely exposed the failure of the Supreme Leader’s plans before their implementation, and has made the need for fundamental changes to ensure the health of society even more apparent.

The Regime’s Current Circumstances

The circumstances of the political power in the IR, the general outlines of which are reflected in a statement entitled "The Second Step of the Revolution," are as follows:

- The Velayat-e-Faqih system, headed by Ali Khamenei, has revealed that it is unhappy with the presence of reformists, moderates and forces close to them in the bureaucracy system, including the government and the parliament. In general, he is distrustful of their existence in the power structure. Therefore, in addition to the fact that every day more than before, he has added to his wide and long parallel system, at the same time, he has missed no attempt to destroy and at least conquer the parliament and the presidential institutions. Until now, the "passionate" elections of the two "elected" branches of the government, the parliament and the presidency, were the expression of the people's vote for the system and a vehicle for the "dignity" of the IR, headed by the Supreme Leader, at the national and global levels. But now the need of the Supreme Leader to end the dichotomy within the government is to focus all the forces in the hands of the absolute Guardianship. The regime, led by Khamenei, has decided to make its ranks more centralized and united so that it can overcome crises and resolve the issue of successor leadership with little fuss.

- Khamenei's repeated and special emphasis on the youth was one of the first signs of his discourse and even practical strategy for the "The Second Step of the Revolution." He has recently taken a "youthful" approach in appointments to designated structures and he is more concerned with the field of faithfulness to the "Islamic Revolution" and school of Guardianship than with the age of the individual. Despite the fact that Velayat-e-Faqih is the main source of structural and institutional corruption in this system, he seeks to remove the "corrupt" from the country's executive network and considers this step necessary for the "The Second Step of the Revolution."

- From an organizational point of view, the grassroots of Velayat-e-Faqih are the commanders of the IRGC, security forces and ideological Basijis and layers of fundamentalist clerics. This does not prevent him from not tolerating authority among IRGC commanders and security officials. By preventing any cohesion in the IRGC, Khamenei has shown that he wants this institution as a powerful arm in the service of his power rather than a partner in political structure. His thesis says that the IRGC can be a powerful body, provided that it is under the absolute control of the Supreme Leader of the armed forces. But in this process, the IRGC commanders, by capturing every new "stronghold" in the power structure of the IR, and especially in protecting their economic interests, will have a more influential position in the future of the system.

- Khamenei and his affiliated institutions are trying to purge the "shaky" elements of the system and their critics and opponents, whose numbers are increasing and to remove all the institutions that these elements have taken from them and to prevent them from gaining power. Of course, this time the Guardian Council's treatment in the parliamentary elections was not of the usual behavior, but it should be looked at from two other angles: 1) the new approach of the "The Second Step of the Revolution", Khamenei is not satisfied with anything other than repelling the less "insiders.” His screening has targeted all those who are more or less prone to stubbornness. The purge of one-third of the former members of parliament is a sign of this approach, 2) preparing to face future tensions, including external ones, even if they face retreat. The IR is faced with the choice to choose from bitter options in the near future.

- In the IR’s structural system, religion has been used as means of governorship but the second Guardian Jurist (Khamenei), however, in a calculated process and relying on bribery and intimidation, was able to bring religious centers such as Qom and other areas under the political and financial authority of the Guardianship system to a large extent. Khamenei has taken the historical self-organization of the seminary from it, has made the highest religious authorities bend to his "Beit" intensions, and forced the exceptional disfavored seminary jurists to stay silent. However, resistance to Khamenei among clerics and growing discontent among seminary students is undeniable.

- It is certain that the rulers did not expect a popular uprising in the dimensions of the December 2019 uprising in any way, but it is more certain that they were already prepared for a "decisive” action against any street protest. Brutal killings of more than a thousand protesters, should not be accessed as the sudden loss of government prudence, but as a sign of their determination to brutally confront any popular uprising. These killings were a premeditated political ploy, based on lessons learned from the 2009 Green Movement, a reflection of in-country version of the prescription written for Bashar al-Assad at early stage of Syrian unrest, as well as the completion of what the regime practiced in January 2017. Opening fire on the people on the street is an irrevocable point in the relationship between the people and the rulers. The regime is determined not to back down in the face of protests, to increase arrests, to increase prison sentences and to block street protests at any cost.

- Khamenei's approach to the massacre of 176 people in the crash of a passenger plane showed that he not only did not look at the events from a national perspective, but also that it was important for him to maintain the social base of the Velayat-e Faqih and its affiliates. At this time of isolation of the IR, he sees his “leadership” mission in inspiring the same military-security base and uniting its shaky ranks.

- Resolving the issue of replacing the existing Supreme Leader should be considered the pivotal issue in the policy of "The Second Step of the Revolution". All of Khamenei's explicit and covert purges during this period in sensitive institutions and relocating their "old" beads are grounds for such efforts to hand over the power to those who are truly faithful to Velayat-e-Faqih. The parliamentary elections were held with the same approach. However, the possibility of unification in the IR is basically an illusion in itself, and there will be a rift in the same parliament.

- The desire of Velayat-e-Faqih system is not only to disperse the ranks of the reformists and to reject and humiliate them, but also to disperse even the fundamentalists. It has difficulty with any organization even those with the least independence. Because it is in this nightmare that every independence, however small, can be a source of evil and danger at a given moment, so no kind of independence should be allowed to form!

Isolation of the Regime and the Descending Course of its Human and Financial Resources

- The system is devoid of its main primary public resources. The regime's "republicanism" has been fueled by the growing grip on the Islamic State. Related to the first claimed "spirituality" that its fulfillment was promised in establishment of the religious rule has been confronted with fraud, lies, and corruption which has pervaded the whole system. The regime official’s promises to address the plight of the deprived people have become counterproductive, and the deepening of the class divide on a large scale has led to a series of general riots by the poor over a short period of time. The result of the alleged national independence is dragging the country into isolation and leading it to the tumult of destructive adventures.

- The IR is on the verge of financial bankruptcy. Monetary reserves from the huge revenue from oil sales are running out. On the other hand, during the period of increasing US government sanctions, its current sales are declining by three-quarters. This situation has created the nightmare of lack of funding for governance and has robbed the system of sleep. It is predicted that even the revenue support of the same contractionary budget for the current year will not be sufficient. Ali Khamenei's "Resistance Economy" is facing bankruptcy in every way, and the entire system is declining.

- Income reduction continues and revenues are in no way sufficient for the regime's expenses. The IR's plan is not to cut its heavy military budget, as its existence depends on the regime's adventures in the region. In the same contractionary budget, strengthening the ranks of the military, law enforcement and security agencies is a priority. Reducing infrastructure costs and creating a balance between income and consumption has only cost the pockets of 70-80 percent of the society, which, even in the current situation, is experiencing deteriorating livelihoods and the threat of growing poverty.

The Foreign Policy of the Regime

- The foreign policy of any government is logically complementary to its domestic policy, which in the IR has an organic and absolutely inseparable aspect with the existence of this system. With costly dreams, Khamenei is violently pushing Iran against its neighbors and the world, and is pursuing the path of suicide for the ruling regime.

- The Guardianship apparatus, headed by Khamenei, has made the slogan of death against the United States, Israel, etc., a political identity card. Drinking the “Poison Cup” by Khomeini after eight years of destructive warfare was much easier than Khamenei's admission of a deadlock in a tense foreign policy that has continued under his responsibility for the past 30 years. Therefore, under his leadership, a fundamental change in the regime's foreign policy is very difficult.

- A key point in explaining the foreign policy of the IR is that with the passing of the years of "pride", it is now experiencing the downward arc of failure. In Syria, the regime has spent a lot of money out of the pockets of the people and inflicted heavy casualties on the Iranian people, but it has not achieved any results. Most of the regime's military installations in that country were destroyed with significant casualties and financial losses by Israelis but the regime is unable to accept the reality due to intense humiliation. The mainstay of the IR, its predominantly Shiite western neighbor has long been facing the popular uprising of young Iraqis who demand the exit of the foreign forces. The Guardianship system interventions have hit the wall of national protest in that country.

- The foreign policy of the IR from the very beginning relied on the game between global divisions and tried to advance its "neither Eastern nor Western" policy on the basis of taking advantage of the confrontation between East and West. But as soon as that dipole structure collapsed, the regime tried to push its ship into the turbulent waters of the post-collapse of the East. And when the global crisis emerged in a different way, especially when the Middle East became the crossroads of global and regional powers, the IR put its reliance on the two Eastern powers, Russia and China. The first an awakened and re-emerging power and the other an emerging power. This reliance was a push to stand up to the United States and at the same time a scarecrow for Europe to take advantage of. This policy, which is essentially an alternative to foreign policy based on balance and constructiveness, is completely contrary to an independent and self-reliant foreign policy.

- The doctrine of the Guardianship apparatus, headed by Khamenei has begun the end of its life in the tension and convulsions with the United States and Israel. The failures of the IR abroad can be considered as the threshold of the failure of the IR and Ali Khamenei in the sphere of Iranian politics. The importance of the opposition's focus on the foreign policy of the IR and opposition to it is no different than the struggle against it on the domestic front.

Gradual Readiness of the Society to Transition from the Current Regime

- The chain of popular movements has become a nightmare for the regime. Not a single day goes by without a new protest from the heart of the society in different dimensions. Workers' movements with minor and major demands, the vibrancy of the university with the direction of fundamental changes in the general situation of the country, women, youth, national minorities and all kinds of cultural and political protest movements’ fight against discrimination are indication of strengthening the objective grounds for transition from this regime.

-The accumulation of anger and decadence of fear is the two main components in today's Iranian social psychology. If the November 2019 uprising, as a continuation of previous protests and social movements showed the eruption of anger, the immediate uprising of the university, as well as the support of workers, teachers, educators, artists and lawyers, in the form of statements and declarations in support of the November protesters at suppression and bloody threat situation signaled the collapse of society's fear of the regime.

- The November uprising was the beginning of the convergence of the social forces of the 2009 Green Movement with the social base emerged from the January 2017 uprising against the domination of the Guardianship system and the manifestation of connectivity of all kinds of socio-economic protests in the 2019 uprising. It was a time that all kinds of anti-discrimination struggles joined together and appeared on the political scene against the whole system. November 2019 was the end of the reformists' influence, who largely did not want to hear the voice of the people in 2017. November 2019 ended their influence, divided them, and significantly reduced their role in the political sphere.

- The regime is now facing three crises at the same time: inside itself, outside the country and most deeply and extensively with the society. The Guardianship system has drawn all sorts of social groups to protest and revolt against itself. The link between these various protests and their common political expression is pointing at the head of the power structure and reflected in the slogan "Down with Khamenei."

- Bread, freedom and democracy, with a very strong secularist theme, set the stage for the people's protests. Many people demand the separation of religion and government and unlike forty years ago, it is not just the rejection of the regime that has brought them together with a harmonic voice, the sharing of democratic demands is very evident in their protest movement.

-The question "What is an alternative and who is it?" is a serious issue in society. Opposition to the regime and fight against it, however, is not conditional on clearing up the ambiguities and concerns about the replacement of the IR have failed to diminish the motives to fight for change. This indicates that objective conditions have taken precedence over the readiness of the subjective element in having a positive effect on developments. Negativism and concerns in this regard, as well as the flow of despair and fear of the "vague future" of the post-IR, have little effect on the determined evolutionary psychology of society.

- From the point of view of most regimes in the region, the IR is considered an unreliable and problematic regime. This regime has more or less incited everyone against itself and has completely isolated the country.

- Currently, tensions between the IR and the Trump administration are at their peak. The US approach, on the one hand, has put the IR in a tight spot, but on the other hand, it is at odds with the democratic, peaceful and just demands of the Iranian people. The US approach and its heavy economic sanctions have put a lot of pressure on the regime, but at the same time these policies are first and foremost hurting the people, especially the poor, and causing them grief. US policy has left the people in distress and the IR's hand more open in suppressing the civil movement of the Iranian people.

- One point, however, is crucial in analyzing the situation and predicting possible developments. That if the regime is forced to choose between two retreats, one against the United States and the other against the demands of the people, it will choose the former. In Ali Khamenei's thought, it is necessary to have domination inside and to attack outside. In determining the priority between regional politics and nuclear conflict, Khamenei's emphasis has always been on the former. Like he issued Fatwa (decree) banning the nuclear bomb, he has repeatedly stressed that regional policy must be maintained, but if "expediency" is required, in this case, too, he can retreat "heroically" to keep the regime alive. For Khamenei, retreating from the current foreign policy is like drinking the “Poison Cup”, but it is far sweeter than retreating against a nation whose demands will not stop. The retreat of the religious tyranny from the current foreign policy of the IR is a step forward for the nation.

What is to be Done?

- The fragility of the Islamic Republic (IR) is due to the more concentration of power in the hands of the Supreme Leader and his entourage which is currently manifested in Khamenei and his court (Beit). Therefore, the transition from the IR is contingent upon the end of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e-Faqih). The tumble of the IR is, in essence, Velayat-e-Faqih, which has concentrated absolute power in the hands of the Supreme Leader and forces under his command.

- This crucial situation requires the coordination and extensive cooperation of the forces in the political sphere of Iran against the IR and, above all, Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. In the transition from the IR, the main direction of our struggle is against the political structure based on Velayat-e Faqih. At the same time, we believe that the people's struggle to force the regime in retreat position in any field and to any extent, is in favor of democratic processes and a step forward in the struggle against religious tyranny.

- To strengthen the struggle, there is a need to combine civil disobedience, street protests and strikes. In this regard, there should be emphasize on both discourse approach and the need to form civic committees with the function of supporting various struggles in the society.

- We consider the cooperation and coalition between the secular and democratic republican currents necessary. To provide an alternative to the IR, we believe that the republicans of Iran should enter into a process of dialogue and wider cooperation and a comprehensive coalition, inclusive of republican parties and political activists in order to create a republican weight in the country's political scene. In such an alliance, further strengthening the gravity of the left will make it more possible for both the pursuit of freedom and justice in the post-IR to take place, and for the alliance itself to become stronger. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of dialogue with other opposition forces and welcome the fact that such an approach should be taken seriously and that the call for dialogue can provide practical opportunities for a smoother transition from the IR to a secular, democratic and just regime.

Central Council of the Left Party of Iran (People's Fadaian)

March 24, 2020

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